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101 
THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA∗ 
This Article describes the historical role of prosecutorial discretion 
in immigration law and connects this history to select executive 
actions announced by President Obama on November 20, 2014.  
“Prosecutorial discretion” in immigration law refers to the decision 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)1 makes about whether 
to enforce the immigration law against a person or a group of 
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 1. The Department of Homeland Security is a cabinet level agency comprised of 
several subcomponents.  The three main immigration subcomponents, Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) all have authority to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion.  See, e.g., Shoba S. Wadhia, Immigration Remarks for 
the 10th Annual Wiley A. Branton Symposium, 57 HOW. L.J. 931, 935 (2014).  This 
authority is typically exercised on an individualized basis pursuant to policy by the 
head of a subcomponent or the Secretary of Homeland Security.  See, e.g., 
Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to Chief Counsels 1 (Oct. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/47984; Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All 
Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel 1 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter June 
2011 Morton Memo], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum from Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. 
Custom & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., and John Morton, Dir., Immigration & Customs Enforcement 1–2 (June 15, 
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
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persons.2  When an immigration officer from DHS chooses not to 
bring legally valid charges against a person because of the person’s 
family ties in the United States or other equities, prosecutorial 
discretion is being exercised favorably.3 
But prosecutorial discretion is not just limited to whether and what 
kinds of charges DHS can bring against the noncitizen.  Other forms 
of prosecutorial discretion, like a decision by DHS to grant deferred 
action to a young person who is thriving as a college student, reflect a 
positive act by the agency.4  In some special cases, DHS may allow this 
person to receive a work authorization and may recognize the person 
as “lawfully present” in the United States.5  Whether prosecutorial 
discretion is carried out invisibly through non-enforcement or overtly 
through affirmative acts, the discretion itself is tenuous.  It leads only 
to an “immigration purgatory” in which the noncitizen is able to 
reside in the United States without the fear of deportation. 
On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced a series of 
executive actions on immigration that highlight the role of 
                                                            
 2. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., to Regional Directors, District Directors, Chief Patrol Agents, and Regional 
and District Counsel 2 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memo]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Leon 
Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Alan D. Bersin, Acting 
Assistant Sec’y for Policy 2 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter November 2014 Priorities 
Memo], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial
_discretion.pdf  (asserting that prosecutorial discretion applies to enforcement 
beyond just the treatment of Notices to Appear, extending to decisions as to  “whom 
to stop, question, and arrest; whom to detain or release; whether to settle, dismiss, 
appeal, or join in a motion on a case; and, whether to grant deferred action, parole, 
or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in a case”). 
 5. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(4) 
(2012) (“Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the authority of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General to grant a stay of removal or 
deportation in any case not described in this subsection.”); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) 
(2014) (allowing persons subject to prosecutorial discretion the ability to apply for 
work authorization); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response:  In Defense of DACA, Deferred 
Action, and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59, 66 (2013) (noting that the 
INA’s implementing regulations explicitly provide that those granted “deferred 
action” may be eligible for work authorization); Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, Clinical Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., et al., to The President 1 (Sept. 3, 
2014) [hereinafter Letter from Law Professors], available at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Law-Professor-Letter.pdf. 
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prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, four of which are 
described in this Article.6  The first policy change—one that has 
received great attention—is the establishment of a new Deferred 
Action for Parents of American and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA) program.  This program will enable undocumented parents 
to request deferred action (a form of prosecutorial discretion) and 
work authorization if they can show (1) continuous residence in the 
United States since January 1, 2010; (2) a relationship as the parent 
to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) child born on or 
before November 20, 2014; (3) unlawful status on November 20, 2014 
and on the date of application; (4) that they are not an enforcement 
priority for removal; and (5) that they pose no other factor that in 
the exercise of discretion would deem DAPA inappropriate.7  If a 
person is unable to satisfy one or more of these requirements, she is 
barred from requesting DAPA.8  In this way, the DAPA requirements 
are likely to operate as bright-line requirements, a conclusion that 
can be confirmed only after more information becomes available 
about the application process and requirements. 
A second policy change will expand the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.  Established in 2012, DACA 
enables young people who came to the United States before the age 
                                                            
 6. See Fixing The System:  President Obama Is Taking Action on Immigration, WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/immigration-action (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2015) (describing the President’s announcement and explaining the 
policies behind the executive actions).  Some other initiatives include:  (1) 
“[e]xpanding the use of provisional waivers of unlawful presence to include the 
spouses and sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents [LPRs] and the sons 
and daughters of U.S. citizens”; (2) “[m]odernizing, improving and clarifying 
immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs to grow [the U.S.] economy and create 
jobs”; and (3) “[p]romoting citizenship education and public awareness for [LPRs] 
and providing an option for naturalization applicants to use credit cards to pay the 
application fee.”  See, e.g., Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last updated Apr. 1, 2015). 
 7. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 4 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter 
November 2014 DAPA Memo], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_acti
on.pdf; see also Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 6; You May Be Able to Request 
DAPA.  Want to Learn More?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ExecutiveActions/EAFlier_DAPA.p
df. 
 8. See Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 6 (allowing parents to make the 
request only if they meet the criteria). 
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of 16 to apply for deferred action if they have resided in the United 
States since June 15, 2007.9  USCIS created internal policies and 
public information about how it would interpret certain terms, such 
as “continuous residence” and “no lawful status.”10  Under the 
original program, DACA recipients were eligible to apply for work 
authorization and were protected from removal for a period of two 
years.11  The changes made to the DACA program on November 20, 
2014 are seemingly simple but significant to people who may have 
been ineligible for the original DACA program.  Specifically, the 
changes announced on November 20, 2014 would extend the period 
a person would receive DACA from two years to three years and 
would manicure the age and residency requirements by removing the 
age cap and adjusting the residency clock to 2010.12  These changes 
make more people eligible to apply. 
A third change made by the President’s executive actions pertains 
to DHS’s enforcement priorities.  Specifically, the President 
announced a new priorities memorandum, entitled “Policies for 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented 
Immigrants” (“November 2014 Priorities Memo”), which sets forth 
refined priorities for immigration enforcement.13  The memo 
                                                            
 9. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-
action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).  When the DACA program 
was established in 2012, it required those requesting DACA to show that they (1) 
were under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012; (2) came to the United States 
before reaching the age of sixteen; (3) had continuously resided in the United States 
since June 15, 2007; (4) were physically present in the United States on both June 15, 
2012, and at the time of making a request for DACA; (5) had no lawful status on 
June 15, 2012; (6) were currently in school, had graduated, or had obtained a 
certificate of completion from high school or general education development (GED) 
certificate, or were an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed 
Forces of the United States; and (7) had not been convicted of a felony, significant 
misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and did not otherwise pose a 
threat to national security or public safety.  Id. 
 10. See, e.g., id. (providing guidance about the types of international travel would 
impact the “continuous residence” requirement); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Standard 
Operating Procedure:  Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), BEPRESS.COM, 
http://works.bepress.com/shoba_wadhia/19 (last visited Apr. 16, 2015) (reporting 
that a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to DHS returned over 400 pages 
of internal memoranda and guidance related to DACA). 
 11. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 9. 
 12. November 2014 DAPA Memo, supra note 7, at 3–5.  The expanded DACA 
program adjusts the date of entry requirement from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010 
and removes the requirement that the applicant be born after June 15,1981.  Id. 
 13. November 2014 Priorities Memo, supra note 4, at 1. 
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commences with a discussion of the Administration’s priorities for 
enforcement, which, in descending order, are:  (1) individuals who 
pose “threats to national security, border security, and public safety,” 
including many individuals with felony convictions and aggravated 
felony convictions; (2) misdemeanants and new immigration 
violators, including recent entrants and those convicted of a 
“significant misdemeanor”;14 and (3) individuals with “other” 
immigration violations including those who have received a final 
order of removal on or after January 1, 2014.15  Based on a plain 
reading of the new DAPA policy, any person who falls within one of 
these priorities is automatically barred from DAPA. 
The November 2014 Priorities Memo does more than simply 
identify the three classes of “enforcement priorities”; it goes on to 
discuss more deeply the role of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration matters.  For example, the November 2014 Priorities 
Memo notes that, as a general matter, DHS should not detain 
noncitizens “who are known to be suffering from serious physical or 
mental illness, who are disabled, elderly, pregnant, or nursing, who 
demonstrate that they are primary caretakers of children or an infirm 
person, or whose detention is otherwise not in the public interest.”16  
Moreover, the November 2014 Priorities Memo creates a formula in 
which lesser priorities are to receive greater consideration for 
prosecutorial discretion when these positive equities are present.  For 
example, Priority 3 individuals may qualify for favorable prosecutorial 
discretion if they are eligible for relief under the law, are “not a 
threat to the integrity of the immigration system,” or have other 
factors that suggest they should not be priorities.17  By contrast, 
Priority 1 individuals may qualify for favorable prosecutorial 
discretion if they are eligible for relief or there are “compelling and 
exceptional factors that clearly indicate the alien is not a threat to 
national security, border security, or public safety and should not 
therefore be an enforcement priority.”18 
                                                            
 14. See id. at 4 (defining “significant misdemeanor” as “an offense of domestic 
violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; unlawful possession or use of a 
firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driving under the influence; or if not an 
offense listed above, one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 
90 days or more (the sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and does 
not include a suspended sentence)” (internal footnote omitted)). 
 15. Id. at 3–4. 
 16. Id. at 5. 
 17. Id. at 5–6. 
 18. Id. at 5. 
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The agency’s willingness to grapple with the more complicated 
cases that may involve a person who both is a potential priority and 
has strong equities is a unique and welcome feature because it 
permits the agency to go beyond a “one-size-fits-all” approach when 
applying its policy on prosecutorial discretion.19  Consider, for 
example, Marta, a woman without lawful status who has resided in 
Washington, D.C., for the last decade and has served as the primary 
breadwinner for her two U.S.-citizen children.  Marta fits within 
Priority 2 because of a shoplifting conviction in Virginia from years 
ago, but she may still qualify for a type of prosecutorial discretion 
because of her equities.  Importantly, the devil lies in how these 
policies are implemented.  In one high-profile case, DHS was 
criticized for deporting Iowa Mennonite Pastor Max Villatoro, a 41-
year-old husband and father who was a priority based on a DUI 
conviction from 1998.20  His attorney, David Leopold remarked:  “I 
can’t imagine anybody who’s more deserving of discretion and falls 
within the exception to the enforcement priorities.”21  Stories like 
that of Pastor Villatoro have yielded criticism by immigration 
attorneys and advocates about whether DHS is properly applying its 
own prosecutorial discretion guidelines. 
As a final and perhaps obvious point, there are noncitizens who will 
neither be eligible for DAPA nor fall within one of the new so-called 
priorities.  For example, Juan may be a father of two U.S.-citizen 
children, have resided in the United States since January 2012, and 
have no indiscretion beyond one traffic offense from 2013.  In this 
case, Juan does not qualify for DAPA, but he may have the 
opportunity to request another form of prosecutorial discretion 
depending on his circumstances.  Some of the factors identified in 
the November 2014 Priorities Memo to be considered for 
                                                            
 19. For a broader explanation, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Felons, Families and 
Prosecutorial Discretion, JURIST (Jan. 2, 2015, 9:30 AM), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2015/01/shoba-wadhia-prosecutorial-discretion.php 
(contrasting the flexibility of the new executive actions to accommodate exceptions 
against the historical practice of DHS deferred action decisions, in which single 
(negative) reasons have driven denials of deferred action, even in the face of 
competing positive reasons). 
 20. Dara Lind, The Government Can’t Enforce Every Law.  Who Gets to Decide Which 
Ones It Does?, VOX.COM (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/3/31/8306311/prosecutorial-discretion. 
 21. Elise Foley, Iowa Pastor Max Villatoro Deported After Community Rallies to Keep 
Him in U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/20/max-villatoro-deported-
_n_6911610.html. 
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prosecutorial discretion include military service, family or community 
ties to the United States, victim status, and other humanitarian 
factors.22 
Finally, President Obama announced that DHS and the 
Department of Defense would collaborate to determine how to 
expand parole to dependents of certain individuals enlisting or 
enlisted in the U.S. armed forces.23  Parole is another form 
prosecutorial discretion that can temporarily benefit a person by 
providing protection from removal and the opportunity to apply for 
work authorization.24  A grant of parole also has long-term benefits 
for someone who wishes to remain in the United States permanently 
(and is legally eligible for a green card) but would otherwise be 
unable to do so because of her immigration history.25 
I. UNDERSTANDING THEORIES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
There are at least three theories behind the use of prosecutorial 
discretion in the immigration context.  The first theory is economic 
and recognizes that the government has resources to deport 
approximately 400,000 individuals annually—less than four percent 
of the deportable population.26  The second theory for immigration 
prosecutorial discretion is humanitarian and acknowledges that there 
are people residing in the United States who have compelling 
equities like a high school diploma or a serious medical condition, 
and thus should be protected from removal.27  A less theorized but 
                                                            
 22. November 2014 Priorities Memo, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 23. See Policy Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Nov. 
15, 2013) [hereinafter Parole in Place Memorandum], available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2013/2013-
1115_Parole_in_Place_Memo_.pdf; Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 6. 
 24. Parole in Place Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2. 
 25. See generally id. at 1–2 (clarifying the use of parole as a means to adjust the 
status of the immigrant spouses, children, and parents of those who have served in 
the armed forces); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Law’s Catch 22:  The Case for 
Removing the Three- and Ten-Year Bars, 19 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1267, 1270 (2014) 
(arguing for the use of parole as a viable alternative to enable individuals otherwise 
subject to the three- or ten-year bars to adjust to lawful status without having to leave 
the United States). 
 26. See June 2011 Morton Memo, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf, superseded 
by November 2014 Priorities Memo, supra note 4. 
 27. See November 2014 Priorities Memo, supra note 4, at 5–6 (stating DHS 
personnel should consider factors such as:  “extenuating circumstances involving the 
offense of conviction; extended length of time since the offense of conviction; length 
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highly politicized third factor is the relationship between 
congressional inaction and public demands for an administrative 
solution.  In the last several years, immigration advocates have 
demanded an extension of administrative remedies to special 
classes.28  DACA reflects one such solution.  President Obama relied 
on all of these theories when announcing his actions on November 
20, 2014.  As to the economics, he declared:  “But even as we focus on 
deporting criminals, the fact is, millions of immigrants in every state, 
of every race and nationality still live here illegally.  And let’s be 
honest—tracking down, rounding up, and deporting millions of 
people isn’t realistic.”29  When discussing the humanitarian reasons 
for creating programs like DAPA, the President remarked: 
Over the past few years, I have seen the determination of 
immigrant fathers who worked two or three jobs without taking a 
dime from the government, and at risk any moment of losing it all, 
just to build a better life for their kids.  I’ve seen the heartbreak 
and anxiety of children whose mothers might be taken away from 
them just because they didn’t have the right papers.  I’ve seen the 
courage of students who, except for the circumstances of their 
birth, are as American as Malia or Sasha; students who bravely 
come out as undocumented in hopes they could make a difference 
in the country they love. 
 These people—our neighbors, our classmates, our friends—they 
did not come here in search of a free ride or an easy life.  They 
came to work, and study, and serve in our military, and above all, 
contribute to America’s success.30 
                                                            
of time in the United States; military service; family or community ties in the United 
States; status as a victim, witness or plaintiff in civil or criminal proceedings; or 
compelling humanitarian factors such as poor health, age, pregnancy, a young child, 
or a seriously ill relative”); see also Meissner Memo, supra note 2, at 7–8 (citing 
relevant factors for consideration); June 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 1, at 5; see 
also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Remarks for the 10th Annual Wiley A. Branton 
Symposium, 57 HOW. L.J. 931, 934 (2014) (discussing the Meissner Memo). 
 28. See Administrative Relief Priorities, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (June 2014), 
available at http://www.nilc.org/adminreliefpriorities.html (urging the government 
to enact broad, administrative relief—including work permits and permanent 
status—for noncitizens who have resided in the United States for long periods). 
 29. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in Address to 
the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-
address-nation-immigration. 
 30. Id. 
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Finally, President Obama discussed how inactivity in Congress 
influenced his announcement.31  He expressed that he was compelled 
to create DAPA and expand DACA because the House Republicans 
refused to vote on the immigration reform bill that passed in the 
Senate in June of 2013.32  He even suggested to Congress that his 
executive actions would no longer be necessary if a bill were passed: 
And to those members of Congress who question my authority to 
make our immigration system work better, or question the wisdom 
of me acting where Congress has failed, I have one answer:  Pass a 
bill. 
 I want to work with both parties to pass a more permanent 
legislative solution.  And the day I sign that bill into law, the actions 
I take will no longer be necessary.33 
Importantly, President Obama’s choice to base his prosecutorial 
discretion policy on humanitarian factors like family relationships 
resembles how prosecutorial discretion, and deferred action in 
particular, has been applied historically.  One of the earliest 
documents used by the immigration agency (then called Immigration 
and Naturalization Service) was an Operations Instruction that 
allowed for “deferred action” (then called “non-priority status”) for 
noncitizens who could show one or more of the following factors:  
advanced or tender age; presence in the United States for many 
years; need for treatment in the United States for a physical or 
mental condition; and adverse effect on family members in the 
United States as a result of deportation.34 
II. DEFERRED ACTION PROFILES 
Since 2009, I have studied DHS data and internal guidelines on 
deferred action obtained through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).35  The following information, gathered from FOIA requests, 
                                                            
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.; see also Elise Foley et al., White House Turns to Aggressive Defense of 
Immigration Actions, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.4, 2014, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/04/white-house-immigration-
actions_n_6272192.html. 
 33. Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation on Immigration, supra 
note 29. 
 34. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service:  Internal 
Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 100–01 (1979) (describing the 
criteria used to determine whether an individual would receive deferred action, 
known then as non-priority status). 
 35. Most of the material I have examined was obtained through FOIA requests 
because the agency has largely operated deferred action as a secret program.  Some 
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illustrates the types of cases that DHS has considered for deferred 
action in recent years.  In reviewing a sample of 578 deferred action 
cases provided by USCIS in 2013, deferred action was granted to 
noncitizens for largely humanitarian reasons.36  In one case handled 
by the Western region, deferred action was granted to a Mexican 
national awaiting a heart transplant that required intensive follow-up 
and care after surgery.37  In one case out of the Central region, 
deferred action was granted to a Brazilian national with Down 
syndrome and autism.38  In another case out of the Northeast region, 
deferred action was granted to a Romanian couple who are parents of 
a U.S.-citizen child being treated for cancer.39  Of 118 identifiable 
deferred action cases processed in 2011, USCIS granted deferred 
action to the twenty-two-year-old daughter with Down syndrome of an 
LPR and to a father of an eight-year-old U.S.-citizen child receiving 
extensive neurological treatment.40  In this data set, the reasons for 
deferred action were largely humanitarian and involved one or more 
of the following factors:  (1) serious medical condition; (2) residence 
in the United States for five years or more; (3) advanced or tender 
age; and (4) family members with U.S. citizenship.41 
USCIS is not the only agency with a history of processing deferred 
action requests.  According to data collected between October 1, 
2011 and June 30, 2012, ICE processed 3,837 requests for deferred 
action and stays of removals, of which 698 were deferred action 
cases.42  Within this sample, DHS granted deferred action to 
noncitizens with U.S.-citizen dependents, present in the United States 
since childhood; primary caregivers to individuals with serious 
                                                            
of the data I have received over the years is also illegible because the agency has not 
historically tracked deferred action and other forms of prosecutorial discretion. 
 36. See, e.g., Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Professor & Dir. Ctr. for 
Immigrants’ Rights, Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law, to U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs. Nat’l Records Ctr. (May 24, 2013), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/shoba_wadhia/25. 
 37. Response to Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Professor & Dir. Ctr. for 
Immigrants’ Rights, Pa. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law, to U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs. Nat’l Records Ctr. 47 (Sept. 3, 2013) (on file with author). 
 38. Id. at 43. 
 39. Id. at 22. 
 40. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets:  Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2012) [hereinafter 
Wadhia, Sharing Secrets]. 
 41. See id. at 42–44 (providing a statistical breakdown of the types of cases in 
which USCIS granted deferred action over a given time period). 
 42. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred 
Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 350, 356 (2013). 
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medical conditions; those with long-term presence in the United 
States; and those with a serious mental or medical care condition. 
While much of my own research has focused on DHS’s historical 
use of deferred action for individuals, the agency has also applied 
deferred action and other forms of prosecutorial discretion to groups 
(still requiring a case-by-case determination by the government) for 
similar reasons.43  For example, several administrations have used 
prosecutorial discretion as an instrument for protecting victims of 
crime, domestic abuse, and sexual assault.44  Similarly, DHS also 
extended deferred action to certain students adversely affected by 
Hurricane Katrina.45  Finally, DHS created a deferred action program 
for the widows and widowers of U.S. citizens.46 
                                                            
 43. Letter from Law Professors, supra note 5, at 3; see also Hiroshi Motomura, The 
President’s Discretion, Immigration Enforcement, and the Rule of Law, PERSPECTIVES, Aug. 
2014, at 1, 6, available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/the_presidents_discreti
on_immigration_enforcement_and_the_rule_of_law_final_1.pdf. 
 44. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION:  THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (forthcoming 2015); Battered 
Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2015) (setting out guidelines as to how battered spouses, children, or 
parents may file for immigrant visa petitions); Victims of Criminal Activity:  U 
Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-
criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-
status (last visited Apr. 16, 2015) (stating that DHS may grant waitlisted U visa 
petitioners deferred action or parole, and the opportunity to receive a work 
authorization). 
 45. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Announces 
Interim Relief for Foreign Students Adversely Impacted By Hurricane Katrina (Nov. 
25, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/F1Student_11_25_05_P
R.pdf (noting that F-2 visa holders impacted by Katrina, who were not otherwise 
covered by relief provided to F-1 visa holders, could request deferred action and 
apply for work authorization). 
 46. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Establishes Interim Relief for 
Widows of U.S. Citizens (June 9, 2009), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-interim-relief-widows-us-
citizens (“Granting deferred action to the widows and widowers of U.S. citizens who 
otherwise would have been denied the right to remain in the United States allows 
these individuals and their children an opportunity to stay in the country that has 
become their home while their legal status is resolved.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ACTION IN IMMIGRATION 
A natural but settled question is whether President Obama or any 
administration has the legal authority to implement the executive 
actions he announced on November 20, 2014.  The legal foundation 
for prosecutorial discretion can be found in the Constitution, the 
immigration statutes created by Congress, binding precedent from 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and regulations and policy documents from 
DHS.  Moreover, as recently as three years ago, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the 
broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. . . .  Federal 
officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to 
pursue removal at all.”47 
The Supreme Court has also analyzed Article 2 section 3 of the 
Constitution, commonly known as the “Take Care Clause”48—a 
section critics of the President’s policy incorrectly invoke to argue 
that he has no discretionary authority over immigration 
enforcement—to explain how prosecutorial discretion decisions are, 
in fact, essential to the faithful execution of the laws of the United 
States.49  To offer one example, the Supreme Court in United State v. 
Armstrong50 held that “[t]he Attorney General and United States 
Attorneys retain ‘[b]road discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal 
laws.  They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as 
the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional 
responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”51 
A review of the immigration statute, sometimes called the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“the Act”), also confirms that 
Congress has sanctioned DHS to use prosecutorial discretion.  One 
clear example of this is section 103 of the Act, which boldly delegates 
                                                            
 47. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  The Constitution delegates to the President the 
power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  Id. 
 49. E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
 50. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
 51. Id. at 464 (citations omitted).  While Armstrong dealt with a selective 
prosecution claim made in the criminal context, the case itself has been cited in 
numerous decisions and policy memoranda about immigration.  E.g., United States v. 
Alameh, 341 F.3d. 167, 172–74 & nn.2, 4–5 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Arenas-
Ortiz, 339 F.3d 1066, 1068–71 (9th Cir. 2003); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Selective Prosecution:  Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071 (1997).  Beyond the scope of this article is yet another 
interesting topic—the relationship between prosecutorial discretion in criminal law 
and the use of such discretion in immigration law. 
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the administration and enforcement of immigration laws to DHS.52  
Similarly, section 242 of the Act prohibits judicial review for three 
specific prosecutorial discretion decisions (commencement of 
proceedings, adjudication of cases, and execution of removal orders), 
only reaffirming the delegation of prosecutorial discretion powers to 
DHS.53 
Beyond the statute there rests a library of authority for 
prosecutorial discretion in the regulations.  Regulations in 
immigration law are precious fuel for interpreting what the Act 
actually means and are binding on the agency.  The regulation at 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), published more than twenty years ago, 
explicitly identifies “deferred action” as one basis for work 
authorization.54  Even before DHS existed, attorneys who knew about 
deferred action utilized this regulation to obtain work authorization 
for clients following a grant of deferred action.55 
                                                            
 52. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012). 
 53. Id. § 1252(g). 
 54. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (1988).  Some 
lawyers have identified INA § 274a(h)(3) as the statutory basis for DHS to issue work 
permits to people residing in the United States without authorization.  See, e.g., 
Memorandum Opinion from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. and the Counsel to the 
President 21 (Nov. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/
2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (“DHS’s power to prescribe which aliens are 
authorized to work in the United States, is grounded in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3), 
which defines an ‘unauthorized alien’ not entitled to work in the United States as an 
alien who is neither an LPR nor ‘authorized to be . . . employed by [the INA] or by 
the Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security].’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3))). 
 55. On the heels of President Obama’s executive actions, Professors Hiroshi 
Motomura, Stephen H. Legomsky, and I authored a letter signed by more than 130 
law professors outlining the multiple legal authorities for immigration prosecutorial 
discretion.  Letter from Law Professors, supra note 5.  This letter was updated on 
November 25, 2014 and March 13, 2015 to affirm the deferred action programs 
announced by the President.  Open Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Professor of 
Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, et al. (Nov. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Motomura Letter], 
available at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/exe
cutive-action-law-prof-letter.pdf; Open Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Clinical Professor of Law, Pa. State Univ., et al.(Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter 
Immigration Professors’ Letter], available at 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf; see also 
Associated Press, Legal Scholars:  Obama’s Immigration Actions Lawful, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
25, 2014, 8:07 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/11/25/us/politics/ap-
us-immigration-scholars.html.  See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Written Testimony of 
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The actions that followed the November 20, 2014 announcement 
were similar to those that followed the creation of DACA.  
Immediately after the announcement, Sheriff Arpaio of Maricopa 
County, Arizona, filed a lawsuit challenging the legality of the 
President’s executive actions.56  This lawsuit was later dismissed by 
Judge Beryl Howell who, in her opinion, remarked:  “The role of the 
Judiciary is to resolve cases and controversies properly brought by 
parties with a concrete and particularized injury—not to engage in 
policymaking better left to the political branches.”57  Twenty-six states 
filed a lawsuit alleging that the President’s November 20, 2014 actions 
violate the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).58  As a counterbalance to the lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the November 20, 2014 executive actions, a flurry 
of amicus briefs were filed by select states’ Attorneys General; 
Brownsville, Texas’s own mayor; and several others to defend the 
actions as a matter of law and policy.59  On February 16, 2015, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Texas Judge Andrew 
Hanen issued a preliminary injunction on the extended DACA and 
DAPA programs, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to bring this 
                                                            
Stephen H. Legomsky Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the 
Judiciary, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/fc3022e2-6e8d-403f-a19c-
25bb77ddfb09/legomsky-testimony.pdf; Stephen H. Legomsky, Written Testimony of 
Stephen H. Legomsky Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary:  Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Loretta Lynch as Attorney General of the United States, SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON JUDICIARY (Jan. 28–29, 2015), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-29-
15%20Legomsky%20Testimony.pdf; Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 40, at 48–60 
(arguing for increased transparency in the use of prosecutorial discretion). 
 56. Brent Kendall, Judge Skeptical of Sheriff Arpaio’s Obama Immigration Suit, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/12/22/judge-
skeptical-of-sheriff-arpaios-obama-immigration-suit. 
 57. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 191 (2014), appeal filed, No. 14-5325 
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 29, 2014). 
 58. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 1, 3, 6, Texas v. United 
States, No. 14-cv-00254 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2014); Elise Foley, Over Half the States Are 
Suing Obama for Immigration Actions, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/states-lawsuit-
immigration_n_6550840.html. 
 59. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Filemon Vela, Brownsville Mayor Files 
Amicus Brief on Behalf of Congressman Vela Defending Executive Action on 
Immigration Policies (Jan. 7, 2015), available at 
http://vela.house.gov/index.php/2013-07-18-16-34-07/press-releases/313-press-
release-brownsville-mayor-files-amicus-brief-on-behalf-of-congressman-vela-defending-
executive-action-on-immigration-policies. 
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lawsuit and concluding that both programs violate the APA because 
they should have gone through a specialized rulemaking process.60  
Notably, 104 law professors issued a letter critiquing the accuracy of 
Judge Hanen’s decision and the immigration law applied in his 
decision.61  Perhaps even more striking than the outcome in the 
Texas case is Judge Hanen’s confusion regarding the role of 
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and the specific sources 
of authority for deferred action in particular.62  It is difficult to know 
when the litigation will come to an end, but one thing is clear—the 
President’s legal authority to create programs like DACA and DAPA is 
on solid ground. 
Beyond the courtroom, the President’s executive actions have been 
the subject of congressional hearings and emotion.  Within a month 
of President Obama’s announcement and, interestingly, before the 
application period for DAPA and expanded DACA (the two more 
controversial programs) even began, the House Judiciary Committee 
held a hearing on December 2, 2014 challenging the legality of these 
programs.63  On December 3, 2014, the House of Representatives 
held a vote on a bill, known as the Yoho bill, that would make the 
President’s November 20, 2014 actions null and void.64  The politics 
of this vote is well captured by this exchange in a Politico story the day 
following the vote:  “Even the bill’s biggest supporters admit the vote 
is more about symbolism than substance.  When asked by a reporter 
whether Republicans were taking the Yoho bill seriously, Rep. Matt 
Salmon (R-Ariz.) replied:  ‘I don’t even know if Ted [Yoho] is.’”65  
The House continued to attack the President’s executive actions by 
holding a vote on a spending bill that would have defunded the 
executive action programs.66  On January 14, 2015, the House voted 
                                                            
 60. Texas v. United States, No. Civ. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *62 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 16, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 61. See Immigration Professors’ Letter, supra note 55. 
 62. See id. at 2–5. 
 63. President Obama’s Executive Overreach on Immigration:  Hearing Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement by Rep. Goodlatte) (“We 
welcome everyone to this morning’s hearing on President Obama’s executive 
overreach on immigration.”). 
 64. Seung Min Kim, House Sends Obama Message with Immigration Vote, POLITICO 
(Dec. 4, 2014, 11:42 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/house-
immigration-vote-obama-113327.html. 
 65. Id. (alteration in original). 
 66. See, e.g., H.R. 240, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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236 to 191 to block the President’s immigration actions.67  
Interestingly, the vote exposed more than one layer within the 
Republican Party, as ten Republicans voted against the bill68 and 26 
Republicans voted against an amendment to end the DACA program 
created in 2012.69  On the heels of this vote, Representative Luis 
Gutiérrez remarked:  “‘Wow.  Time flies when you’re playing politics 
with people’s lives . . . .  What are the headlines today?  Behold the 
Republican immigration strategy, mass deportation.’”70 
The politics that emerged after President Obama announced his 
executive actions on immigration resemble the politics that followed 
the creation of DACA.  For example, a lawsuit was brought in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
alleging that DACA was unconstitutional.71  Similarly, select members 
of the House of Representatives introduced a piece of legislation and 
held a hearing on a bill titled “Hinder the Administration’s 
Legalization Temptation Act” (HALT), which, among other things, 
would have nullified a variety of discretionary remedies in the 
immigration statute and the President’s authority to grant select 
forms of prosecutorial discretion.72 
As I reflect on the political statements and plays that have debuted 
since the President’s executive actions, there is a feeling that, 
intellectually, people unfamiliar with immigration law or the history 
of prosecutorial discretion in immigration systems should refrain 
from speaking authoritatively about the subject, and also, practically, 
                                                            
 67. Ed O’Keefe, House Votes to Block Obama’s Immigration Actions—But Exposes New 
GOP Divisions, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/01/14/house-votes-
to-block-obamas-immigration-actions-but-exposes-new-gop-divisions. 
 68. The ten Republicans who voted against the bill include Reps. Justin Amash 
(Mich.), Mike Coffman (Colo.), Carlos Curbelo (Fla.), Jeff Denham (Calif.), Mario 
Díaz-Balart (Fla.), Robert Dold (Ill.), Renee Ellmers (N.C.), Thomas Massie (Ky.), 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Fla.), and David Valadao (Calif.).  See Rebecca Shabad & 
Cristina Marcos, House Passes Bill to Defund Obama’s Immigration Orders, HILL (Jan 14, 
2015, 12:06 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/229469-house-votes-
to-defund-obamas-immigration-orders. 
 69. See H.R. 240; O’Keefe, supra note 67; Shabad & Marcos, supra note 68. 
 70. Shabad & Marcos, supra note 68. 
 71. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-cv-03247, 2013 WL 8211660, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 
July 31, 2013). 
 72. See H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (2011) (suspending discretionary remedies 
including parole, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status for certain 
nonpermanent residents; temporary protected stats, deferred action, and extended 
voluntary departure). 
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that questionable lawsuits and symbolic legislative activities dampen 
the pockets of the taxpayer. 
The political impetus to challenge the legality of the President’s 
executive actions stems in part from the number of people who may 
qualify for these actions—especially from the creation of the DAPA 
program.  Estimates from the White House suggest that more than 4 
million people will benefit from the President’s executive actions.73  
Notably, although the scale of President Obama’s executive actions is 
significant, they do not reflect something new as a legal matter nor 
do they confirm that the actual number of eligible people who will 
apply or may receive DAPA will even come close to 4 million.  In the 
case of DACA, for example, just fifty-five percent of the estimated 1.2 
million eligible individuals applied for the program after it had been 
in place for two years.74  Some of the reasons an eligible person may 
choose not to apply for a program include the inability to pay the 
application fee, fear of deportation for oneself or a family 
member(s), inability to obtain the documents necessary to prove 
eligibility, or lack of access to an immigration attorney or non-profit 
group because of a cultural, language, and/or geographic barrier.75  
Possibly, the new deferred action programs will undergo an even 
larger drop in applications because of the confusion and fear 
surrounding the temporary injunction issued by Judge Hanen and 
the ongoing removals of noncitizens identified as enforcement 
priorities.76 
                                                            
 73. More Than 4 Million Undocumented Immigrants Will Now Be Able to Play by the 
Rules, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/more-4-
million-undocumented-immigrants-will-now-be-able-play-rules. 
 74. JEANNE BATALOVA ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DACA AT THE TWO-YEAR 
MARK:  A NATIONAL AND STATE PROFILE OF YOUTH ELIGIBLE AND APPLYING FOR DEFERRED 
ACTION 4–5 (2014), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/daca-two-
year-mark-national-and-state-profile-youth-eligible-and-applying-deferred-action. 
 75. See id. at 4 (reporting that applicants must be able to pay the application fee, 
meet the eligibility criteria, and have the knowledge to navigate the application 
process); ROBERT G. GONZALEZ & ANGIE M. BAUTISTA-CHAVEZ, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL, TWO YEARS AND COUNTING:  ASSESSING THE GROWING POWER OF DACA 6 
(2014), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/two-years-and-
counting-assessing-growing-power-daca (highlighting the barriers that the 
application fee, distrust of the system, lack of paperwork, and not meeting the 
eligibility criteria impose on potential applicants). 
 76. See, e.g., Mark Noferi, ICE Sweeps Up Minor Offenders with Families, Using Heavy-
Handed Approach, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/03/13/ice-sweeps-up-minor-offenders-with-
families-using-heavy-handed-approach. 
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Beyond the legality and politics of the President’s executive actions 
is a real tension about whether programs like DACA and DAPA 
reflect good policy.  Some of the sources for this strain stem partially 
from a fear about the potential size of the class to whom 
administrative relief would be provided and also from the negative 
image produced by a hostile Congress.  Another source of tension 
relates to work permits.  For some critics, the challenge to President 
Obama’s prosecutorial discretion programs lies with the ability it 
creates for beneficiaries of these programs to apply for work 
permits.77  The reality, however, is that DHS and its predecessors have 
a long history of considering work authorization based on 
prosecutorial discretion.  One sample size obtained through FOIA 
reveals that between June 2011 and June 2013, 17,040 work 
authorization applications for noncitizens from more than 150 
countries were based on a grant of traditional deferred action.78  Of 
the 17,040 applications, DHS granted 13,135 or seventy-seven 
percent.79  Indeed, questions about how many people should qualify 
for prosecutorial discretion, the kind of criteria that should be used 
to determine eligibility for such protection, and whether the 
protection itself should be a form of deferred action that is 
accompanied by work authorization are all policy questions that 
predictably trigger great emotion—ranging from fear to compassion. 
Fear has often been a feature in the creation of and reaction to 
immigration policy.  Perhaps compassion is a better source for policy 
than fear.  The above-described history provides a good indication 
that programs like President Obama’s prosecutorial discretion 
programs are not new ideas.  By combining traditional humanitarian 
criteria, such as a close family relationship, long-term residence in the 
United States, or presence in the United States since childhood with 
sound procedures, a bold prosecutorial discretion policy like the one 
announced by the President is a prudent response that will lead to a 
sensible but temporary solution. 
 
                                                            
 77. See Josh Blackman, Obama:  Giving Immigrants Work Permits Is Vital for National 
Security, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 24, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/415845/obama-giving-immigrants-work-
permits-vital-national-security-josh-blackman (echoing the criticism of Judge Hanen 
that the President’s plan to provide work authorizations is gratuitous because a 
reprieve from deportation should suffice). 
 78. Letter from Jill A. Eggelston, Dir., FOIA Operations, to author (July 22, 2013) 
(on file with author). 
 79. Id. 
